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The current civil war is being waged 
by the Sinhalese-dominated govern- 
ment and the forces of militant Tamil 
nationalism spearheadedby the Libera- 
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Con- 
servative estimates indicate that some 
50,000 people have lost their lives as a 
direct result of the conflict. This figure 
does not include disappearances. The 
war has also produced one million in- 
ternally-displaced people and 700,000 
mainly Tamilrefugees whohave sought 
asylum in various European countries, 
North America, Australia and India. 
The Sri Lankan civil war is one of the 
most violent conflicts in the world. Fo- 
cusing on an aspect of this conflict, the 
UN Working Group on Enforced and 
Involuntary Removal of Persons states 
that Sri Lanka ranks number two in the 
world in terms of disappearances, next 
only to Iraq.'Last year, in October, more 
than 2,500 soldiers and Tigers died in a 
week-long battle in the northern part of 
Sri Lanka. Yet, the Sri Lankan war is one 
of the forgotten wars. While intema- 
tional media focuses attention on the 
self-determination struggles in Kosovo 
and Kurdistan, Sri Lanka appears to be 
too far-metaphorically and literally- 
from strategic concern of the West. 
In a recent New York Times editorial 
onNATO's war against Yugoslavia, the 
rationing of war news was cited as a 
familiar problem among American mili- 
tary leaders and their civilian superi- 
ors. The editorial went on to note that 
military briefings eroded Washing- 
ton's credibility during the Vietnam 
war.. . the Pentagon has continued to 
try to manage combat information, 
even during the impressive military 
successes of the Persian Gulf war.2 
The information disseminated on the 
Sri Lankan war is no different. It has 
been erased from the face of Sri Lankan 
media by way of government censor- 
ship. No journalists, foreignor local, are 
permitted into the war zones. The infor- 
mation that is available is tightly con- 
trolled, manipulated and delivered 
through official military press confer- 
ences. The whole process is a classic 
example of what NoamChomsky iden- 
tifies as "manufacturing consent." Even 
in the absence of censorship, the main- 
stream media have not been critical of 
government policy of achieving peace 
through war. 
In 1999, human rights monitors 
noted that the situation in the conflict 
areas of Sri Lanka is grave.3 There re- 
mains, however, a perception that areas 
that do not directly experience the civil 
war are safe and that the government 
respects the human rights of its citizens 
in those areas. This perception has 
found its way into the decisions of Cana- 
da's Immigration and Refugee Board. 
One of the most common reasons for 
rejecting the refugee claims of both 
Tamils and Tamil Muslims4 is the ap- 
plication of the "internal flight altema- 
tive" principle-the notion that a 
person may indeed be at risk of persecu- 
tion within the northern or eastern re- 
gions of the country but is expected to 
find safety by relocating to the south and 
the capital city of Co10mbo.~ This is also 
a perception shared by a number of 
European g~verxunents.~ 
The purpose of this article is to 
present a dissenting view that casts se- 
rious doubts on thevalidity of these gen- 
eralizations. The article will also review 
the human rights situation in Sri Lanka, 
with particular reference to the develop- 
ments in the southern part of the coun- 
try, in order to assess the prospects for 
human rights compliance and peace 
building. 
Ethnic Enmities 
Let us start by listing certain incidents 
which have not been reported in any 
detail by mainstream media in Sri Lanka 
but only by Sri Lankan human rights 
monitors and some alternativenewspa- 
pers supported by human rights organi- 
zations. 
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On September 7,1998, a dispute be- 
tween two individuals-one Sinhala 
and the other Muslim-in Kurunegala, 
a small town in the south, erupted into 
a clash between Sinhalese and Muslims 
in the area. Muslim shops were attacked 
and burned. Posters in the Sinhala lan- 
guage calling for a boycott of Muslim 
shops came up in the town7 
On September 8,1998, two S i a l a  
men were killed on an estate in the 
Ratnapuara district as a result of a pri- 
vate dispute. On the nights of September 
8 and 9, gangs raided several areas of 
upcountry Tamils and torched over 300 
homes known as line rooms. 
O'n September 26, 1998, in 
Kochchikade in the Negombo district 
just outside of Colombo, a disagreement 
between a Tamil trader and someneigh- 
bours over the construction of a parapet 
wall flared up into a Sinhala-Tamilcon- 
flict. Two Tamil shops were burned 
down and several other incidents of 
arson and violence were reported. 
On February 17, 1999, forty shops 
belonging to the Muslim community 
were burned in Nochiyagama, 206 kilo- 
metres northeast of Colombo. Tension 
between Muslim and Sinhalese commu- 
nities continued for several weeks. 
In Kiribathgoda, a suburban town 
about 15 kilometres from Colombo, a 
bomb explosion in June 1998 destroyed 
anewly-built, Muslim-owned commu- 
nication centre. This was later identi- 
fied as part of a campaign against 
Muslim traders in the town. Residents 
told journalists and members of human 
rights groups who visited the area that 
no shop in the Bazaar area was permit- 
ted to display a Tamil sign board and 
that a systematic campaign had been 
launched to evict the minority traders 
from the area. Similar developments 
have been recorded in Welimada, 
Galagedera, Matale and Puttalam. 
The ease with which conflicts that 
erupt between individuals in the past 
months have been quickly transformed 
into ethnic pogroms targeting Tamil 
and Muslim minorities is significant. 
The above-mentioned incidents point to 
a further escalation of ethnic tensions in 
Sri Lankan society. It is becoming in- 
creasingly evident that a n t i - T d  or 
anti-Muslim riots could well become a 
part of daily life. In particular, well-or- 
chestrated campaigns against the Mus- 
lim traders in certain areas (Galle, 
Garnpaha, Puttalam, Kurunegala) are a 
reflection of a rapidly-deteriorating 
situation for the minority communities 
in the southern part of the island. 
Careful scrutiny of the above inci- 
dents reveals that these are not just iso- 
lated events. There is a definite pattern 
of "ethnic cleansing" that must be 
placed in a proper context. For the past 
several years, Sinhala organizations- 
including the National Movement 
Against Terrorism (NMAT), Sinhala 
Veera Vidhana (Sinhala Warriors Soci- 
ety), All Ceylon Buddhist Congress 
(ACBC), Jathika Sanga Sabha (National 
Assembly of Buddhist Monks), and the 
Sinhala Commission-have launched 
a widespread public campaign against 
the minority communities, while at the 
same time protesting against political 
negotiation and third-party mediation 
to find a peaceful solution to the ethnic 
conflict. These organizations receive 
extraordinarily wide publicity in the 
mainstream Sinhala and English lan- 
guage press.8 Some of these organiza- 
tions also have their own newspapers 
in the Sinhalalanguage. Some domestic 
human rights groups-notably Move- 
ment for Inter racial Justice and Equality 
(MIRJE), and alternative weekly 
Sinhalese language newspapers such 
as Yukthiya and Raavaya-accuse sec- 
tions of the government as well as the 
opposition United National Party 
(UNP) of supporting these movements. 
In early November 1998, the Move- 
ment against Terrorism (MAT) at- 
tempted to disrupt the delegates' 
meeting organized by the National 
Peace Council, an umbrella organiza- 
tion of peace groups in Colombo. How- 
ever, the meeting went on and was 
attended by some 1,700 people from 
south and east Sri Lanka. As the meeting 
was underway, MAT demanded that 
prominent peace activists be arrested 
and charged under the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act (PTA). 
Similarly, the Sinhala Veera Vidhana 
(SW), whose activities gained momen- 
tum in 1998, has focused on defending 
the interests of the 
majority. Under the 
the United Sinhala 
of Sinhala traders 
rights groups 
threat from the 
Muslims. While 
for guarding south Sri 
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validity of the election had 
cably undermined.1° 
ous violation of free 
which is abasic tenet of 
the government's 
of democracy.ll 
Arrests and Detention ~ 
Large-scale, random 
based on their 
working with the gove-nt, Presi- 
dent Chancirika Kumaratun a setup an 
anti-harassment committ last year. 
The purpose of the commi ee was to 
regularize cordon and sea ch proce- 
dures and minimize the s ering and 
harassment of Tamils in the 011th. The 
codttee came UP with se iera1 useful 
recommendations. The 
ground, however, has 
committee proved to 
tive in the face of 
cover police and 
tion, the journalist was( released 
without being charged.12 ' 
Under 
mitted to enter conflict zon s. This has 
severely limited access to inf t mtion.  It 
also has enabled the gov+nment to 
evade any public scrutiny qf atrocities 
committed in the war zonesi It is within 
this climate of hostility, 
xenophobia, and 
rights in the south that initiatives for 
peace and reconciliation need to be ex- 
amined. 
Peace Initiatives 
The broader consensus among various 
peace groups in Sri Lanka is the call for 
third-party mediation and the introduc- 
tion of federalism as a means for achiev- 
ing an end to the conflict. The various 
peace groups have formed a coalition 
called the National Alliance for Peace. 
The National Peace Council, one of the 
constituent members of the National 
Alliance for Peace, held its first confer- 
ence in Colombo in October 1998. Three 
thousand people attended it, and the 
organizers received congratulatory 
messages from the Sri Lankan govern- 
ment as well as LTTE. 
The National Peace Council contin- 
ued its work of educating Sri Lankan 
Members of Parliament about peace 
processes and agreements in other 
countries. In December 1998, it organ- 
ized a delegation of parliamentarians 
from all political parties, local council 
members, and Buddhist monks to visit 
Bangladesh, where there is an on-going 
peace process in the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts between the Bangladesh govem- 
ment and the Jumma people-based 
ParabatrayaChattagram JanaSanghati 
Somity (PCJSS). 
The peace groups have achieved 
some progress when they were able to 
engage the major business organiza- 
tions in the struggle for peace. The 
Ceylon Chamber of Commerce, the Na- 
tional Chamber of Commerce, the 
Ceylon National Chamber of Indus- 
tries, the Federation of Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry in Sri Lanka, 
and the Exporters Association of Sri 
Lanka are the organizations that jointly 
invited all the political parties and 
peace groups for a meeting. At the meet- 
ing, they came up with a ten-point pro- 
gram for a peaceful settlement of the 
conflict and called for all political par- 
ties to consider their program. 
In an attempt to elicit the perspectives 
of the "border villagesn-villages situ- 
ated along areas in the northeast that 
separate majority Sinhalese and minor- 
ity Tamil &d Muslim peopl-n war, 
several community-based organiza- 
tions under the auspices of MIRJE have 
come together as the Co-ordinating 
Committee for the Border Villages. The 
committee has initiated a series of fact- 
finding missions to villages located in 
eight districts: Puttalam, Anura- 
dhapura, Vavuniya, Polonnaruwa, 
Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Amparai, and 
Moneragala. The committee's interim 
report entitled "Emerging issues in the 
border villages" was submitted to the 
government and LTTE leadership in 
December 1998, following a rally which 
was attended by 5,000 people from the 
border villages affected by war. 
In his November 1998 annual Great 
Hero's day speech commemorating the 
fallen LTTE martyrs, the LTTE chief 
Prabhakaran expressed his willing- 
ness to open a dialogue with the govem- 
ment to find a lasting solution to the 
war. However, the govemment did not 
respond to his offer in a positive man- 
ner. Yet, in an exclusive interview with 
the Indian magazine Frontline, Presi- 
dent Chandrika Kumaratunga indi- 
cated the possibility of negotiations 
with LTTE, but with a tight time frame.13 
In January 1999, a South African parlia- 
mentary team visited Sri Lanka. South 
African President Nelson Mandela's 
offer of mediation has been welcomed 
by LTTE and peace groups in Colombo. 
However, the Sri Lankan govemment is 
sceptical about negotiations and it is 
certainly not willing to accept third- 
party mediation yet. Whatever material- 
izes in terms of mediation, there are 
some fundamental issues that need to be 
addressed before embarking upon any 
peace process. 
The prospects for durable peace in 
the absence of a drastic restructuring of 
the post-colonial Sri Lankan state, 
which is highly centralized and unrep- 
resentative of minorities, appear slim 
indeed. 
The Sri Lankan State 
One of the major factors that has contrib- 
uted to the ethnic conflict and its escala- 
tion into civil war, is the nature and 
structure of the post-independence Sri 
Lankan state and its policies toward 
ethnic minorities. The state apparatus 
I 
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itself became monolithic, representing 
the Sinhala-Buddhist majority in the 
aftermath of independence." Thisproc- 
ess began at the time of independence in 
1948. It was replicated by governments 
of all shapes and stripes, and culmi- 
nated in the constitutional entrench- 
ment of Sinhala Buddhist dominance 
over the minorities in the Republican 
Constitution of 1972 and the 1978 Con- 
stitution. The constitutions declared 
Sinhala the only official language (Arti- 
cle 19) and conferred the "foremost 
place" to Buddhism (Article 9), thereby 
defining the Sri Lankan polity as essen- 
tially a Sinhala Buddhist state. Even in 
the much-publicized 1995 devolution 
proposals-later modified to the "legal 
draft of January 1996" and used as a 
template to formulate a draft constitu- 
tion in October 1997-the government 
failed to address these fundamental is- 
sues. The draft constitution proposed to 
eliminate provisions with regard to the 
unitary nature of the state, paving the 
way for change from a centralized, 
unitary model to a decentralized, 
federal model. However, the govern- 
ment is clearly reluctant to incorporate 
multiethnic and multilingual reality of 
SriLankan society into this draft consti- 
tution.15The draft constitution has also 
nminto another problem: it has failed to 
win the support of the main opposition 
Sinhalese party, the United National 
Party (UNP). Without support from the 
UNP, the draft cannot be made into law, 
as it requires a two-thirds majority ap- 
proval in Parliament, which the govem- 
ing coalition does not have. For this 
reason, there is little likelihood of con- 
stitutional reform in the near future. 
In my view, the fundamental changes 
necessary for a peaceful, equal and just 
coexistence of the different ethnic com- 
munities in Sri Lanka should include a 
restructuring of the state along federal 
or confederal lines and the transforma- 
tion of public institutions to be repre- 
sentative and inclusive of the country's 
population. From the current situation 
in which the institutions of Buddhist 
faith and national governance are en- 
meshed, a policy of secularism must be 
adopted. For democracy to thrive in Sri 
Lanka, it is important that primacy is 
not accorded to any particular religion, 
language or culture, because unrecog- 
nized minority group claims for self-de- 
termination, nationhood, and identity 
are the roots of the current civil war. 
Disappearances 
The overall effect of security legislation 
enacted at the time of war-Emergency 
Regulations, Prevention of Terrorism 
Act (PTA)-and growing impunity 
have contributed to grave human rights 
violations. This legislation is still in 
place. Recommendations made by the 
UN Working Group on Enforced and 
Involuntary Removal of Persons and 
Amnesty International that the legisla- 
tion be brought in line with interna- 
tional standards, however, have not 
been implemented. According to Am- 
nesty International reports, more than 
600 people disappeared in Jaffna alone 
in 1996.16 Another 190 cases were re- 
ported in 1997. According to the report 
of the three commissions appointed by 
the government to inquire into disap- 
pearances, 16,742 people disappeared 
between 1988 and 1994. Another 10,135 
cases are stillbeing inquired into.17 The 
human rights groups say that the 
number of disappearances is more than 
60,000. An analysis in the journal Chris- 
tian Worker suggests that 60 percent of 
the people who disappeared were be- 
low 30 years of age; 14.82 percent of 
those disappeared are children below 
18years.18 Yet, the present government 
has not appointed a commission to in- 
quire into disappearances that took 
place after it came to power in 1994. 
There are reasons to believe that the 
disappearances arenot just the result of 
"excesses," as widely claimed by the 
successive governments, but are carried 
out as a deliberate official policy. In- 
deed, overwhelming evidence indicates 
that the political leadership has been 
the cause of the disappearance of tens of 
thousands of persons.lg 
For example, witness reports and 
narratives from petitioners to the disap 
pearance commission illustrate the fact 
that what we are looking at in terms of 
disappearances in Sri Lanka, is an or- 
chestrated, well-planned state policy 
whichstillexists. TheU.S. State Depart- 
ment's coju\try report on Sri Lanka also 
indicates that the security forces were 
responsible for 33 extra-judicial killings 
and at least eleven individuals disap- 
peared ini 1998. It also reported that 
another 25 people disappeared or were 
killed after being seen last near the ar- 
my's forward defence lines.20Most dis- 
appearances now occur in the context of 
war, a fact that the government often 
invokes to justify and explain away the 
human rights violations. 
Amnesty International report (1998) 
states that torture and ill-treatment in 
army and police custody are wide- 
spread, and the government has unau- 
thorized places of detention in the 
north, east, and in C o l o m b ~ . ~ ~  The U.S. 
State Department report also states that 
torture d impunity for those respon- 
sible for htunan rights abuses remain a 
serious problem in Sri Lanka." 
Food as a Weapon of War 
According to Save the Children Fund, 
800,000 persons in the war-ravaged 
north and east now depend on govern- 
ment food rations. Prior to the onset of 
the civil war, people in these regions 
were self-sufficient farmers, fisherfolk 
and employees in the service sector. A 
government-imposed economic em- 
bargo, a ban on fishing, and the continu- 
ing insecurity of civil war have 
decimated the region's economic base 
and deprived the local population of 
even minimal level of subsistence. Of 
the half-million displaced persons in 
the region, 140,000 people are housed in 
350 government-run camps. 457,000 
people live in LTTE controlled areas in 
the distridts of Mullaithivu, Vavuniya, 
Kilinochci and Manna~- .~~ 
Since 1995, the government has taken 
control of the distribution of relief sup- 
plies on the grounds that such supplies 
distributed by humanitarian agencies 
might fall into the hands of LTTE. The 
Additional District Secretary of 
Mullaithivu district says that out of 
40,000 displaced families that need dry 
rations in the district, only 14,000 are 
getting it.t4 
Throughout the last quarter of 1998, 
there were many reports of high rates of 
malnutritlion and starvation among 
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more than 80,000 families in 
Kilinochchi and Mullaithiw districts 
in the north. These people are suffering 
due to persistent cuts of dry rations by 
32 percent introduced by the govern- 
ment in July 1998. Following protests, 
the decision with respect to Jaffna and 
Mannar districts has been reviewed. 
However, the cuts remained in place in 
the rest of the northeast. 
The issue of food has been a bone of 
contentionbetween the Ministry of De- 
fence and Tamil government officials in 
these two districts. While government 
agents, Doctors without Bord~rs (MSF), 
the International Committeed the Red 
Cross (ICRC), and other relieforganiza- 
tions maintain that many displaced 
persons in these areas are starving due 
to denial of food, the government con- 
tends that figures of persons eligible for 
dry rations are inflated and falsified. 
However, there is no evidence to sup- 
port the government's claim. In Decem- 
ber, the government permitted the 
Commissioner General of Essential 
Services to visit some areas under the 
controlof LlTE. After the visit, the Com- 
missioner increased the number of peo- 
ple eligible for dry rations by 50,000. 
Still the food supply is inadequate. 
The denial of adequate food rations 
as well as medicine and medical sup- 
plies to the areas of conflict ane a serious 
human rights violation. Jord&n J. Paust 
argues that the Sri Lankan govern- 
ment's denial of these necessities to the 
displaced violates Geneva conventions 
and constitutes war crimes.a5 
Human Rights Defenders 
There has been a systematic campaign 
against non-governmental organiza- 
tions (NGOs) and human rights groups. 
While the government itself is responsi- 
ble for the call to monitor NGOs, xeno- 
phobic groups and mainstream media 
are very vocal and active in their cam- 
paign against human rights groups. 
Peace groups are gaining somenew mo- 
mentum, but they are often slow and too 
late to respond. Some of the peace 
groups initially supported the present 
government. Some senior atembers of 
the peace movement laterbecame part of 
the propagandaunit of the gavernment. 
This has created the problem of credibil- 
ity of these groups among the minority 
communities. The other difficulty asso- 
ciated with the peace lobby is its lack of 
sufficient grassroots work and support. 
Nonetheless, in the past few years, 
peace groups in Sri Lanka have reorgan- 
ized themselves and appear to be main- 
taining their independence vis-&-vis the 
state. 
In May 1998, Peace Brigade Intema- 
tional (PBI), which had been working in 
Sri Lanka for nine years providing pro- 
tection to persons at risk of political vio- 
lence, terminated its work in Sri Lanka 
when Defence Ministry officials de- 
manded that FBI submit all its reports 
before publication. 
The government pushed through an 
amendment to the Voluntary Social 
Service Organizations (Registration 
and Supervision) Act, which allowed 
the government to replace the NGOs' 
executive committee with an interim 
board, if there was evidence of fraud or 
misappropriation. The original act it- 
self allowed government officials to in- 
spect NGO offices and attend meetings. 
Practically all human rights groups, 
media monitors, and civil rights groups 
in Sri Lanka are NGOs. These organiza- 
tions vehemently opposed the Volun- 
tary Social Service Organizations 
(Registration and Supervision) Act. 
The 1999 Human Rights Watch re- 
port also points out that 
local and international organizations 
that worked in the conflict areas or 
withconflict-affected people faced re- 
strictions on their activities, and some 
found themselves accused of parti- 
san loyalties. 
The report further states that peace 
groups and groups advocating free ex- 
pression also ran the risks of censure.26 
Politics of LTlX 
The emergence of LTTE as a major mili- 
tant force in the mid-eighties was the 
result of its unrelenting guerilla attacks 
on Sri Lankan forces since 1983, and its 
ruthlessness ineliminating all its oppo- 
nents, including other Tamil militant 
groups in Tamil society. In the past 
twenty years, L'ITE has been trans- 
formed into one of the most organized, 
resourceful, and brutal militant organi- 
zations in the world. 
In Sri Lanka, the president declared 
that LTTE was an illegal organization 
and effectively banned it last year. Nev- 
ertheless, it is clear that LTTE has been 
a major player in the struggle of Tamil 
people. Richard Falk, a respected 
American political scientist, has sug- 
gested that in international law terms, 
LTTE qualifies as a national liberation 
movement, much like the African Na- 
tional Congress (ANC) during the 
apartheid era in South Africa.27 In the 
context of a systematic human rights 
violations, LTTE and other Tamil na- 
tionalist groups have the right to use 
force as a means of self-defense and 
achieving a just and reasonable solu- 
tion to the problem. However, LTTE 
must be condemned for exploiting the 
same tactics of terror meted outby the Sri 
Lankan security forces. 
LTTE appears willing and capable of 
perpetuating a protracted guerilla war 
as a political strategy until the right 
"moment," when the internationalcom- 
munity will accept a separate state for 
Tamils. In addition to documented au- 
thoritarianism and ruthlessness, there 
is growing evidence of Tamil chauvin- 
ism within LTTE and Tamil diaspora 
communities in Europe and Canada.28 
The vision of a Tamil nation that is 
gaining ascendancy is the idea of an 
exclusive Tamil "nation," devoid of 
Tamil-speaking Muslims. Muslims 
were systematically expelled from the 
Tamil majority northern province by 
LTTE in 1990. Also, the activities of 
peace groups in the south are not only 
viewed with suspicion but are also 
outrightly ridiculed and condemned by 
these radical elements. For instance, the 
respected National Peace Council, an 
umbrella group based in Colombo, has 
been labelled by these elements as 
Sinhala and a racist peace council. 
LTTE was responsible for many 
deaths of civilians in the southern part 
of the country. The deaths occurred 
during LTTE suicide-squad bombings 
in Colombo. At least four political as- 
sassinations in the Jaffna peninsula in 
1998 were attributed to LTTE.29 
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Conclusion 
Peace cannot be imposed from the top. 
It has to be cultivated from below. This 
needs an enormous amount of pains- 
taking community mobilization, educa- 
tion and a conducive political climate. 
It is unfortunate that the political lead- 
ers of the parties involved in the conflict 
are totally incapable of understanding 
the plight of ordinary people. 
The peace process can be avery diffi- 
cult path to embarkupon given the open 
wounds and the protracted enmity be- 
tween the communities. However, there 
is an urgent need for Tamil and 
Sinhalese nationalists to look very criti- 
cally at their policies and programs/ 
pogroms. The strengthening of the 
peace lobby in the south, whatever limi- 
tations it may have, is a necessary and 
worthwhile project for Tamils. 
Any durable peace in Sri Lanka is 
conditionalupon reconciliation among 
the various communities. In the absence 
of any meaningful political and social 
reconciliation, only two scenarios will 
claim the terrain. One, SriLanka will go 
into the next millennium with increased 
bloodshed and more refugees. Two, if 
the Sri Lankan state continues with its 
failure to address the fundamental is- 
sues that underlie the conflict, bifurca- 
tion of the island will be the logical end 
result. 
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